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Apocalypse Now?
Fundamental Tax Reform and Residential Housing Values
ABSTRACT

Using a simulation model crafted to integrate the short-run and long-term impacts of tax
reform on the housing market, we find modest impacts from fundamental reform of the Federal
income tax. These results suggest that concerns over the impact of tax reform on housing values
and household net worth are overstated. To the extent that reform is otherwise desirable, fears of
drastic effects on the housing market should not stand as an impediment to reform.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed numerous calls for overhaul of the Federal income tax. The

most dramatic of these proposals seek to replace the income tax with a comprehensive
consumption-based tax. Inter alia, such reforms would eliminate the tax-favored status of
owner-occupied housing, leading some commentators to raise the specter of a massive decline in
housing values, substantial windfall losses in the housing wealth of U.S. households, and largescale defaults on mortgage obligations. For example, in a widely-publicized study, Data
Resources Incorporated (DRI) predicted an apocalyptic fall in housing values, estimating that the
Flat Tax (one consumption-based alternative) would result in an aggregate decline of 15 percent
in housing values, equivalent to a loss of $1.7 trillion in housing equity (see Brinner et al.
[1995]).
Fears of massive housing price impacts could serve as a severe impediment to reform.
But are they justified? In some sense, downward pressure on residential housing values would be
inescapable. Comprehensive consumption taxation would both eliminate the existing taxsubsidies to owner-occupied housing and also tax its use. It is straightforward to expect
households to reduce their demand for owner-occupied housing. But the DRI analysis does not
reflect such optimizing behavior. Instead, the forecast $1.7 trillion decline in housing values is
simply the present value of the benefits lost by elimination of the mortgage interest and property
tax deductions.1
In a related analysis, Capozza, Green, and Hendershott [1996] (hereafter, CGH) reach
conclusions similar to those of DRI. CGH assume that the user-cost of owner-occupied housing
is unchanged by reform, and calculate the change in housing values consistent with this
assumption. However, if the rental price is unchanged, the long-run quantity demanded must
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also remain fixed. Thus, the assumptions employed imply that the size of the housing sector will
be completely unaffected by fundamental tax reform.
Our purpose is to revisit the impact of consumption tax reform on housing values in a
setting consistent with both a downward-sloping demand for housing services and rational
valuation of houses as assets. Moreover, it is desirable to distinguish between the transitory
response of the housing market to tax reform and the longer term (steady-state) implications. To
accomplish our goals, we develop a dynamic, perfect foresight simulation model of the
residential housing sector. The model is tailored to identify the aggregate impacts, tracing the
intertemporal interaction between demands derived from a representative household and supplies
based upon a Tobin’s q model of new construction.
In this setting, it is possible that a consumption tax reform would raise the value of
existing homes. To see why, consider a scenario in which individuals do not itemize deductions
of mortgage interest or property taxes (which is the case for 40 percent of homeowners) and in
which the consumption tax takes the form of a 20 percent value-added tax (VAT). Eliminating
deductibility would, obviously, have no direct impact on existing homeowners, while the VAT
would raise the cost of new homes by 20 percent. Older, existing homes would enjoy a tax-based
advantage of 20 percent, leading to a rise in their value, ceteris paribus. Over the longer term,
construction activity would eliminate the distinction between existing and new homes, and the
price differential along with it. But during the transition, the tax reform would have the perhaps
surprising effect of enhancing the value of older homes. To the extent that households itemize,
the loss of deductibility mitigates this effect, but the underlying tendency remains.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop our model of the housing
sector, while in Section 3 we discuss the parameterization of our simulation model and
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alternative strategies to implementing consumption-based tax reform. Section 4 contains our
results, the bulk of which suggest a relatively modest impact of tax reform on housing values.
In Section 5 we examine the sensitivity of our baseline results to a number of alternative
assumptions, especially the role of land in the production of housing and the dynamic adjustment
of housing prices.

2.

MODELING THE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING SECTOR
We require a model capable of delivering both the long-run predictions from fundamental

tax reform, as well as the explicit dynamic path for the value of housing during the transition to
the new long-run equilibrium (steady state). In developing our model, we build upon the work of
Summers [1983] and Poterba [1984].
To begin, we observe that housing serves the dual role of consumption good and
investment vehicle. The latter requires that homeowners be indifferent between holding their
house and investing in an alternative asset. That is, asset market equilibrium requires that
S
& [tp (1& ) % % m]PH % PÚH
H
i (1& ) '
PH

(2.1)

where i is the nominal rate of interest, is the individual’s marginal income tax rate, S is the
annual implicit service flow (imputed rent) from ownership, H is the amount of housing, tp is the
property tax rate, is the percentage rate of depreciation, m is the percentage rate of maintenance
costs, PH is the price of a house, and the dot “·” denotes a derivative with respect to time.2 In
effect, (2.1) displays the requirement that the return (imputed rent plus capital gain) on housing
net of property tax, depreciation, and maintenance costs be equal to the net return on an
alternative investment.
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It is useful to transform (2.1) in several ways. First, in the spirit of Tobin’s q theory of
investment, define QH as the ratio of housing value to replacement cost, with the latter
normalized to 1.0 per house. Thus, QH = (PH H)/H = PH. Second, assuming equilibrium in the
market for housing services, let the annual service flow be a function of the housing stock
S ' S ( H ).

(2.2)

Finally, substitute (2.2) into (2.1) and solve for the change in QH necessary to maintain asset
market equilibrium. The result
S(H)
QÚ H ' i (1& ) % t p (1& ) % % m Qh &
H

(2.3)

allows one to track the equilibrium dynamics of the price of housing relative to its replacement
cost. Equation (2.3) ignores the distinction between equity and mortgage financing costs,
assumes that all mortgage interest and property taxes are fully deducted, and assumes that interest
income is fully taxable. We can relax these assumptions. Let

denote the loan-to-value ratio

(i.e., the fraction of the house value that is mortgaged), the portion of financing costs that are
deductible, the fraction of property taxes that are deductible, and e the portion of interest
income that is taxable. Equation (2.3) then becomes
QÚ H ' i

(1 & ) % (1& ) (1 & e ) % t p (1& ) % % m Qh &

S(H)
.
H

(2.3’)

Viewed as one part of a system of equations describing housing market dynamics, (2.3') shows
the relationship between current housing values (QH) and quantities (H) and future changes in the
price of housing.
To completely describe the evolution of the market requires a dynamic model of housing
supply. We assume that new construction (C) is an increasing function of QH , the ratio of
housing value to replacement cost. That is
-4-

C / HÚ '

(QH )H .

(2.4)

As in the q-theory of investment (see, e.g., Mayoshi [1982]), we assume that when housing
values equal the replacement cost, there is no incentive for the housing stock to change; i.e.,
(1) = 0.3
Taken together (2.3’) and (2.4) comprise a standard asset market-oriented model of tax
incidence in the spirit of Summers [1983] and provide a setting within which to analyze the
transitional dynamics of the housing market. A convenient means to do so is the phase-diagram
in Figure 1. In this figure, the steady state is at H* and QH* (where market value equals
replacement cost, i.e., QH* =1). In itself, the steady state is not very interesting—the long-run
price of houses is simply the exogenous replacement cost. There are, however, some interesting
dynamics present. The transition to the steady state is shown by the saddle path marked with
arrows and permits short-run fluctuations in the asset price of houses.
To gain a feel for the analysis, consider the scenario discussed earlier. Specifically,
assume that there is no deductibility of mortgage interest or property taxes and that a
consumption tax is imposed via a business level tax such as a VAT or the Flat Tax. The key
feature of such a reform is that the tax on residential housing is imposed solely on new
construction and not on existing housing. Specifically, it raises the “break-even” value of a new
home from 1.0 to (1+t), where t is the consumption tax rate.4 Thus, the long-run value of QH
(

)

rises from QH ' 1 to QH ' 1 % t ; that is, in (2.4)

(1 % t) ' 0 . As shown in Figure 2, the

QÚ H ' 0 locus is unaffected, while the HÚ ' 0 locus shifts upward.5
As a result, the steady state level of H declines to H ) ; exactly what one would expect
when a tax on housing is introduced. However, the transition to the new steady state takes place
in two steps. Instantaneously, the value of H is fixed; the market adjusts to the need for making
the transition by having QH (and PH) jump up at the existing housing stock (from A to B).
-5-

Intuitively, old houses are more valuable because they do not face the consumption tax; people
will bid up the price of such houses until they are indifferent between the existing stock and the
new, taxed housing.6 In the aftermath, housing prices move to the long-run equilibrium and the
size of the residential sector shrinks as the market evolves toward the new steady state (B to C).
In short, in the absence of deductibility, the transition to this consumption-based tax on
new houses leads to a short-run rise in values of existing homes. However, the example ignores
several features of reality, most notably deductibility of mortgage interest and property tax
payments. How does deductibility affect the analysis? The major difference is that removing
deductibility applies to both new and old houses. As shown in Figure 3, removing deductibility
alone results in a downward shift in the QÚ H ' 0 locus. Thus, in contrast to the example above,
removing deductibility results in an immediate fall in values of new and existing houses, and a
subsequent transition to a new steady state that has lower quantities of housing.
Taking Figures 2 and 3 together, the transition from the current system to a consumptionbased tax system has an ambiguous effect on housing values. Moreover, to the extent that values
either rise or fall, the persistence of these effects will depend upon the speed of adjustment
embodied in the dynamics of housing supply (equation (2.4)). Thus, the sign, size and duration
of the net effect may be determined only by a quantitative evaluation, to which we now turn.

3.

SIMULATING TAX REFORM
Consumption-based tax reforms could be implemented in a variety of ways. The most

direct is a national retail sales tax which would entail a tax on the purchase of a new home,
raising its price.7 Similarly, the consumption tax could be implemented as a VAT; again the
reform would appear in the housing market as a tax on transactions in the construction and sale
of new homes.8 Finally, “Flat Tax” proposals derived from the work of Robert Hall and Alvin
-6-

Rabushka may best be viewed as a VAT in which taxes on the wage base are collected at the
household level, while taxes on the remainder of value added remain collected at the firm level.9
Numerical analysis of any given proposal requires that we choose among these
alternatives, but that we transform the model in three ways. First, we must choose specific
functional forms for our demand-side and supply-side relationships. Next, we must adopt
specific values for the parameters for our functions and for both the current system and proposed
tax systems. Finally, we must solve the non-linear, simultaneous equations that characterize the
evolution of housing market prices and quantities.

3.1

Solution Method

We solve the model in three steps. First, we work with a version of the model in which
the variables of interest (e.g., housing prices and quantities) are entered as logarithms. This
moves the center of attention away from overall levels in favor of logarithmic changes; i.e.,
percentage changes. Next, we linearize (in logs) the model in the vicinity of the post-reform
steady-state values and compute our simulations using this linearized version. Finally, we
impose upon our solutions perfect foresight. Specifically, using an iterative search, we calculate
the initial decline or jump in asset prices such that the entire subsequent sequence of asset price
changes leads precisely to the post-reform steady state.

3.2

Functional Forms and Parameter Values

The basic parameters are shown in Panel A of Table 1. We assume that the representative
homeowner faces a property tax at a rate of 1.4 percent and that maintenance and depreciation
average 3.0 percent of the house value. Also, we assume that the service flow and housing stock
are linked by the constant elasticity function
-7-

S ' So H
where So is a constant and

(3.1)
< 0 is the inverse price elasticity of demand. Our settings for the

parameters of the function are also shown in the table. For our baseline simulations, we choose
the (inverse price) elasticity of demand for housing services to be =-2.0, but we vary this value
between -0.5 and -3.0 to gauge the impact of this parameter on the simulations. On the supply
side, we use a baseline elasticity of construction with respect to QH ( ) of 0.8. Again, however,
because the responsiveness of new construction to the alterations in the tax regime are central to
the dynamics of the housing market we vary this elasticity between 0.1 and 0.9.10
We model two reforms: (1) a partial reform, eliminating the deductibility of mortgage
interest and property taxes, and (2) the variant of the Flat Tax proposed by Congressman Armey
and Senator Shelby. For purposes of comparison, we follow closely the choices of CGH in
choosing our numerical parameter values for these reforms, which are shown in Panel B of
Table 1.
We set the nominal, pre-tax interest rate at 7.5 percent and assume that it is unaffected by
the tax reform. There is considerable debate regarding the impact of tax reform on interest rates;
our goal is to focus on the act of reform itself and abstract from ancillary economic impacts.11
Note that, ceteris paribus, this choice likely serves to maximize the negative impacts of tax
reform, because any reduction in interest rates would serve to raise housing values. Following
CGH, we set the average marginal tax rate in the current system at 0.22. When simulating the
effects of removing deductibility in a revenue-neutral framework, we again follow their guidance
and employ a rate of 0.194. We set the tax rate for the Flat Tax at 0.17.12
As noted in CGH, roughly 40 percent of homeowners do not itemize; we set the fraction
of mortgage interest and property tax deductible equal to 0.60. Under each of the reforms
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mortgage interest is not deductible, so we set =0. Similarly, property taxes lose their deductible
status under both of the reforms examined.
The next two rows of the table show the financing and construction cost of housing,
respectively. To focus on the real valuation of assets, we fix the loan-to-value ratio ( , above) at
0.4 throughout.13 We assume that the (normalized) replacement cost of a unit of housing is
exogenously set at 1.0. Under the Flat Tax the business-level tax raises the tax-inclusive breakeven replacement cost correspondingly.14 The final row of Table 1 shows a parameter that
indicates the fraction of capital income that is subject to tax (e). We choose a pre-reform value
of e = 0.5, a choice based on Engen and Gale [1996] that reflects the widespread existence of taxpreferred saving vehicles that permit substantial amounts of interest (and other capital income) to
escape income taxation. Because capital income taxation is eliminated by the Flat Tax, e falls to
e = 0.0.

4.

SIMULATION RESULTS
We turn now to the results of simulating the reforms. The simulations provide two types

of responses: changes in the steady-state in the housing market and the dynamics of adjustment
between the original and new steady states. Although not the primary focus of this study, we
begin with the former before turning to an analysis of the adjustment paths.

4.1

Tax Reform and Steady-State Responses

Our examination of steady-state responses begins in Table 2.15 As shown, and in direct
analogy to Figures 2 and 3, the steady state changes in the value of QH are dictated directly by the
tax regime. Under the Flat Tax the steady-state value of QH rises by a percentage amount equal
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to the business-level tax on new construction. Simply removing deductibility has no effect on QH.
In contrast, the contraction in the quantity of housing stock differs markedly across the
alternative reforms. Consider the first row of the table, which shows the results of our baseline
simulation. Under these assumptions, removing the deductibility of mortgage interest and
property taxes induces a steady state decline of 1.9 percent in the housing stock. By contrast, the
Flat Tax results in a greater steady-state decline of 8 percent in the quantity of owner-occupied
housing. In short, removing the tax-subsidy to owner-occupied housing and/or taxing it leads to
a smaller housing stock, an unsurprising qualitative result. Moreover, because the Flat Tax raises
the effective price of housing consumption more dramatically, it has a greater effect on the
quantity demanded.16
These steady-states are constructed under the partial equilibrium assumption that the
long-run supply of housing is perfectly elastic at a constant replacement cost, so changes in the
parameters of the construction function do not affect these simulations. Changes in the
parameterization of housing demand, however, do influence the nature of the steady state. In
particular, the rows of the table show the effect of varying the value of . Looking across
columns, varying the service-flow-to-stock relationship does not alter the ordering of the housing
stock impacts of the reforms. Glancing down rows, however, indicates that the parameter is
crucial for determining the real impacts of tax reform. As the absolute value of the elasticity of
the demand for housing (with respect to the rental rate) falls (i.e., as

grows in absolute value),

the smaller the decline in the stock of housing. Not surprisingly, the more elastic is demand, the
greater the impact of introducing a tax.
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4.2

Tax Reform and Dynamic Adjustment

At the heart of our model is the specification of housing market dynamics. Consider
Figure 4, which shows the impact of removing the deductibility of mortgage interest and property
taxes. As shown, the immediate effect is a reduction in housing values, an impact consistent
with the theoretical prediction in Figure 3. However, the magnitude of the decline is only a bit
more than one percentage point and is quickly reversed.
By comparison to removing deductibility, the Flat Tax is a much more fundamental
reform. However, our simulation of the effects of the Flat Tax (Figure 5) does not suggest a
dramatic decline in housing values. Instead, the short-run impact is for prices to rise by roughly
10 percent and ultimately by 17 percent.17 This is the response precisely suggested by Figure 2.
Thus, the decline due to the loss of deductibility is more than offset by the positive impact on
prices of the business-level tax.
Not surprisingly, the supply elasticity is important to the process of dynamic adjustment.
To gain a feel for the impact, we re-computed our simulated reforms using a much lower value of
the supply elasticity, , of 0.3 instead of 0.8. Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 4 indicates that the
lowered responsiveness generates a larger initial decline and a slower convergence to the new
long-run equilibrium. However, the main message of Figure 6 appears to be that, for plausible
parameter values, the housing market implications of removing deductibility are quite modest. A
similar lesson emerges from comparing Figures 5 and 7. Again, a less responsive construction
industry leads to stronger downward pressure on prices—in this case a smaller rise—and slower
adjustment to the steady state.
To summarize, under our assumptions the long-run impact of tax reform on housing
prices appears to be minimal. The key is our view that, despite its large absolute size, the
housing market is best thought of as a price-taker with respect to the remainder of the economy.
- 11 -

Hence, long-run prices are best thought of as driven by highly elastic supply conditions. Of
course, housing quantities will be responsive to reform. Those reforms that reduce the taxsubsidy to housing and raise the effective price, will lower the demand for housing.
The more important impacts concern the transition to the steady state. In a model
designed to highlight these transitional issues we find that, for plausible parameter values, the
likely impact of tax reform on the housing market is quite modest.

5.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Our results stand in sharp contrast to fears of a housing market crash in response to tax

reform. Why? One possibility is that carefully modeling the transitional dynamics generates the
“right” answer; our model is constructed especially to capture such effects. Of course, one might
wonder if the model is capable of producing adverse effects on the housing market at all. Even if
so, the possibility remains that our model is too stylized to capture important dynamics. In this
section, we address each issue in turn. First, we construct “worst case scenarios” that maximize
the short-run impact on housing prices. Next, we examine the sensitivity of the dynamic
structure to the introduction of a relatively slowly adjusting residential land market into our
simulations.

5.1

Worst-Case Scenarios for Tax Reform

Figures 8 and 9 show the short-run impacts and dynamic adjustments to tax reform under
“worst-case” conditions. Specifically, we assume that all homeowners itemize their deductions
and that each home is fully mortgaged (i.e., the loan-to-value ratio, , is 1.0), thereby maximizing
the impact of the loss of deductible mortgage interest. Moreover, we focus the analysis on the
homes of the well-to-do by assuming that all households have a marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent.
- 12 -

Similarly, we assume that the supply response ( ) is a minimal 0.1 and that

is -0.5. The

combined effect of these choices is that housing prices are forecast to fall by roughly 18 percent
in response to the loss of deductibility (see Figure 8) and to recover much more slowly.
Similarly (see Figure 9), in these circumstances the move to a Flat Tax results in a decline of 12
percent in housing prices, in contrast to the upward pressures found before. One interpretation of
these results is that while the aggregate housing market would be relatively unaffected, one might
expect particular market segments to show a greater response to tax reform.
5.2

The Role of Land in Housing

The discussion thus far has treated housing as a reproducible capital good available at an
exogenously set long-run price (normalized to the replacement cost of 1.0). At the other
extreme, one might argue that the essence of housing is residential land that is fixed in supply.
Thus, one should treat the quantity of housing as exogenous, and permit the long-run price to
adjust. In practice, both capital and land are embodied in housing units and neither is perfectly
inelastic in supply. Hence, following Poterba [1984], we expand the model to incorporate the
use of both land and capital in the production of housing units.
Specifically, we assume a Cobb-Douglas function for the production of housing H
H ' K L 1&

(5.1)

where K is housing structures and L is land. In analogy to the discussion above, the supply of
capital and land to the housing sector is determined by the valuation of these factors relative to
their (exogenous) replacement cost. Specifically, if

K

and

L

are supply elasticities:

KÚ '

( QK) K ' QKK K , and

(5.2)

LÚ '

( QL) L ' QL L L .

(5.3)

Thus, the specification permits differential speeds of adjustment for the capital market and the
land market.
- 13 -

To parameterize the model, we assume that

is equal to 0.85, that

K

is 0.8, and

L

is 0.2.

The latter two assumptions are intended to capture the relatively slow adjustment of the land
market compared with the market for capital goods. The implications of these assumptions are
apparent in Figure 10, which displays the impact of removing deductibility on factor usage in the
residential housing market. As the figure shows, the quantity of capital inputs reaches the steady
state value relatively quickly, while the use of land inputs adjusts much more slowly.
Interestingly, the initial impact of the tax reform is to raise the usage of land, a feature
that may be traced to the factor price movements depicted in Figure 11. In the aftermath of the
tax reform, the asset price of land falls relatively more (1.9 percent versus 1.2 percent) than that
for capital. Ceteris paribus producers shift to a more land-intensive mix of factor usage.
Eventually, however, the overall contraction of the housing sector leads to less demand for both
capital and land.
As before, however, the overall magnitudes of the shifts in prices and inputs are relatively
modest, under 2 percent. The overall impacts are collected in Figure 12, which shows the time
path of the adjustment of the composite good “housing” and its price. Even with the inclusion of
a more realistic specification of the production structure, this particular (partial) reform does not
generate a large dislocation in the housing market.
The results of analogous simulations for the Flat Tax are depicted in Figures 13 through
15. Beginning with the latter, one finds that the two-factor housing model generates the same
overall implications as those from our more parsimonious specification. Turning to the former
figures, one sees that the Flat Tax generates the same short-run incentives to shift the mix of
factor usage toward land and away from capital (Figure 13).18 And, as captured by Figure 14, the
Flat Tax places upward pressure on the prices paid by producers of new housing.19
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5.

CONCLUSIONS
Using a carefully specified simulation model crafted to integrate the short-run and long-

term impacts of tax reform on the housing market, we find modest impacts from even
fundamental reform of the Federal income tax. These results suggest that concerns over the
impact of tax reform on housing values and household net worth may be overstated and, to the
extent that reform is otherwise desirable, should not stand as an impediment to reform. Our
results stand in contrast to other analysts’ predictions of dramatic impacts on the housing market.
The difference may be traced to a modeling strategy that embodies forward-looking household
behavior in the demand for housing services and housing assets. Or, perhaps the difference is
unsurprising. As Gale [1997] points out, the British tax system has steadily scaled back tax
preferences for housing with essentially no noticeable impact on the housing market.
Of course, our analysis comes with several caveats. As with any simulation study, the
results are dictated by the parameter values chosen; improved empirical guidance regarding some
of the key parameters would be a valuable avenue for future research. In particular, much
remains to be learned regarding the relationship between new construction and the valuation of
existing houses. Second, our aggregate model is not capable of delineating important
distributional effects; whether these effects be computed across individuals, across density of
housing (urban versus suburban), or across regions. Finally, the model is partial equilibrium.
While this permits one to focus on owner-occupied housing, it precludes understanding fully the
implications of the relationships between the market for owner-occupied housing, rental housing,
and the economy as a whole.
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Notes

1.

DRI estimates the value of the mortgage interest ($62 billion) and property tax ($22
billion) deductions to be $84 billion annually. Using a real discount rate of 0.05, the
value of this in perpetuity is $1.7 trillion.

2.

As noted earlier, we develop and solve our model under the assumption of perfect
foresight with respect to price changes (and other aspects of the future). While this is
advantageous for understanding transitional dynamics and asset accumulation, it
precludes the incorporation of portfolio decisions or other aspects of uncertainty.

3.

By definition, C is the change in the housing stock or net new construction. Gross
construction, which includes replacement of depreciation, will still occur when C = 0.

4.

Note that PH = H = 1+t is the gross of tax, or consumers’, price. The net of tax, or
supply, price remains 1.0 in the new steady state, exactly the incentive required to induce
zero net new construction.

5.

We model the reform as both unexpected and permanent. The latter is in the spirit of a
“fundamental” reform, while the former tends to magnify the initial effects on existing
home prices. To the extent that an actual reform may be anticipated, prices will tend to
rise or fall prior to the reform itself.

6.

Note, however, that the initial jump is smaller than the amount of the tax. Thus, the
supply price of new housing falls at the same time the demand price rises. This provides
the correct incentive for the size of the housing sector to shrink. The magnitude of the
jump from A to B depends upon the size of the change in the steady state values and the
speed of adjustment as determined by equation (2.4).

7.

In equilibrium, the purchase price of the house is equal to the present value of the future
consumption stream. Hence a tax on the purchase price is equivalent to “prepaying” a
stream of future taxes on the annual consumption value.

8.

The equivalence between the retail sales tax and the VAT is perhaps most easily seen by
viewing the VAT as a multi-stage collection mechanism for the tax on the final product.

9.

Another possibility is a “consumed income tax” administered entirely at the household
level, however political realities appear to preclude this approach. Thus, for example, we
do not address the USA tax of Senators Nunn and Domenici.

10.

Many observers feel that housing market supply responses are asymmetric—increases are
more elastic than contractions in supply. Our simulations focus exclusively on scenarios
that result in a decline in the stock of housing, and our elasticities are best interpreted in
this context.

11.

See Hall and Rabushka [1995] for a discussion suggesting a decline in interest rates.
Feldstein [1995] argues that reform would not lower, and might even raise, interest rates.
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12.

The long run tax rate is 0.17 in the Armey-Shelby bill, although a higher tax rate prevails
during a transition period.

13.

Households will also respond to tax reforms by altering the financing of their homes (see
Follain and Sturman [1997]). Of course, in doing so, they will choose the financing mix
that is most advantageous, thereby serving to minimize the impact on housing prices. In
this way, our assumptions allow us to provide an upper bound to the impact of tax reform.

14.

The flat tax would be a simultaneous reform of the individual and corporation income
taxes. Within the context of this analysis, the elimination, for example, of the corporation
income tax would affect all sectors of the economy, and would be captured by the impact
on the cost of capital. As noted, we do not attempt to quantify these impacts, focusing
instead on the differential effects of the (new) consumption tax on residential housing.

15.

The steady state values are computed by setting QÚ H ' 0 in equation (2.3), imposing the
long-run value of QH, and solving for the corresponding value of H.

16.

These results are consistent with those found in static, general equilibrium analyses of
housing. Berkovec and Fullerton [1992] estimate that the removal of the mortgage
interest (property tax) deduction would reduce the stock of housing by 2.6 (2.1) percent.
Nakagami and Pereira [1996] find that removing the mortgage interest deduction would
reduce housing wealth by less than 1 percent.

17.

Again, note that the net-of-tax price of new housing initially declines, exactly the
incentive required to induce a contraction in the supply of housing.

18.

This is hardly surprising as the Flat Tax reform embodies the removal of deductibility.

19.

The prices are gross of tax. Net of tax returns decline during the transition, providing the
incentive to shift capital and land out of the housing sector.
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Figure 1: Housing Market Equilibrium and Dynamics

Figure 2: Dynamic Response to Business-Level Tax

Figure 3: Dynamic Response to Removing Deductibility

Figure 4: Remove Deductions
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Figure 5: Flat Tax
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Figure 6: Remove Deductions
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Figure 7: Flat Tax
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Figure 8: Remove Deductions
Worst-Case Scenario
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Figure 9: Flat Tax
Worst-Case Scenario
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Figure 10: Remove Deductions - Baseline
Two-Factor Model
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Figure 11: Remove Deductions - Baseline
Two-factor Model
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Figure 12: Remove Deductions - Baseline
Housing Stock/Price Movements (Two-factor Model)
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Figure 13: Flat Tax - Baseline
Two-factor Model
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Figure 14: Flat Tax - Baseline
Two-factor Model
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Figure 15: Flat Tax - Baseline
Housing Stock/Price Movements (Two-factor Model)
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Table 1. Parameter Values
Panel A
Parameter

Value

Property Tax Rate (tp)
Housing Supply Elasticity ( )
Inverse Price Elasticity of Demand ( )
Maintenance and Depreciation (m + )

0.014
0.8
-2.0
0.03

Panel B

Interest Rate (i)
Average Marginal Income Tax Rate ( )
Percent of Mortgage Interest Deductible ( )
Percent of Property Tax Deductible ( )
Loan-to-Value Ratio ( )
QH
Percent of Interest Income Taxable (e)

Original
0.075
0.220
0.600
0.600
0.400
1.000
0.500

Remove
Deductibility
0.075
0.194
0.000
0.000
0.400
1.000
0.500

Flat Tax
0.075
0.170
0.000
0.000
0.400
1.170
0.000

Table 2.

Baseline
( = 0.8, = -2,
= -0.5
= -1.0
= -2.5
= -3.0
Note:

Percentage Changes from Initial to New Steady-States

Remove Deductibility
Percent Change
Percent Change
in QH
in H
0
-1.9

Flat Tax
Percent Change
Percent Change
in QH
in H
17.0
-8.0

= 0.4)
0
0
0
0

-3.8
-2.8
-1.6
-1.4

17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0

-15.5
-11.8
-6.9
-6.1

= structure supply elasticity; = inverse elasticity of housing demand; = loan-to-value ratio.
Percentage changes for various values of are identical to those in the baseline case.
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